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Asymmetric Warfare Defined
Few strategic leaders seem familiar dealing with nonstate actors and are struggling to find "revolutionary" solutions to problems. Many are convinced that the present strategic environment is absolutely unique and argue that war has completely changed its nature. They assert that today's wars are "asymmetric"
or "hybrid" and require innovative approaches, creative ideas and, of course, more time and resources to be solved. In response, this strategic research project (SRP) first describes the concept of asymmetric war and its origins. It then traces the evolutions of the concept all the way through the introduction of the concept of hybrid war. Next, this paper summarily examines two historical case studies, the First Jewish-Roman War (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) and the Philippine-American War (1899 ( -1902 , to find analogies with the concepts. Finally, it analyses these theories through the lens of critical thinking and demonstrate that these "new" constructs are anything but original, and that asymmetry and hybridism have been common characteristic of war through the ages.
The origins of the theory can be found in a 1974 study from Andrew Mack the First and Second World Wars "served to reinforce and to rigidify the pervasive notion that superiority in military capability (conventionally defined) will mean victory in war." 3 He highlighted that numerous conflicts in the years following the Second World
War proved that "military and technological superiority may be a highly unreliable guide to the outcome of wars." 4 The stated focus of the essay was on analyzing the reasons how and why the external powers were forced to withdraw from asymmetric conflicts. 5 Mack, in order to define "asymmetry," noted that in many post World War II conflicts the "relationship among the belligerents was asymmetric," meaning that: the insurgents posed no direct threat to the survival of the external power, lacking an invasion capability, while the external power had not only the power of invasion but also the power of occupation; for the insurgent the war was "total", while for the external power it was "limited." Nevertheless, the external power had the pervasive expectation of victory due to its conventional military capability. In other words, the asymmetric relationship envisaged was a "function of the asymmetry in 'resource power'." 6 Mack took the Vietnam War as an example of asymmetric war and highlighted three main lessons taken from the conflict. First, pre-eminence in military force does not guarantee victory and under certain circumstances could be counterproductive; second, under certain conditions, the theatre of war takes in the polity and social institutions of the external power; third, guerrilla strategists put great importance on "protracted warfare." 7 The author concluded that for the insurgent to win, he had to not lose; this goal can be achieved by refusing to confront the external power on its own terms and by resorting to "unconventional" forms of warfare, including guerrilla operations, urban terrorism and even nonviolent action. The insurgent can achieve his objectives if the opponent's political capability to wage war is destroyed. The external power cannot be defeated militarily, but the insurgent can adopt a strategy of "political attrition" and increment the cost of the war, thereby eroding the will of the external power, and forcing a military withdrawal. 8 
Evolution of the Concept
Regrettably, Mack's analysis remained unnoticed due to the Cold War.
Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II defined "Strategic Asymmetry" as the "use of some sort of difference to gain an advantage over an adversary," stating very clearly that "[i]n war there are always differences between the opponents." 9 The authors add that the concept is as old as warfare itself and that these differences are sometimes insignificant and other times important. The work of Metz and Johnson well summarized the evolution of the concept in U.S. strategic thinking. Accordingly, the first explicit mention of asymmetry appeared in Joint Publication 1 (1995). 10 The authors state that the U.S. Department of Defense mostly focused its strategic thinking on negative asymmetry, intended as forms of threat, and not on positive asymmetry, intended as the use of differences to gain advantage. 11 Exceedingly interesting is the consideration of the two authors that sometimes asymmetry is "by default", suggesting that "antagonists Subsequently, informed by a deserter that the insurgents were exhausted and many sentries fell asleep during the night, Vespasian's son, Titus, lead a small detachment of particularly well trained legionaries over the wall, dispatched the sentries, and opened the way for the attacking formations.
escape by boat and gathered in the centre of the adjacent lake; Vespasian ordered dozens of rafts built to attack the rebels. On every raft he put legionaries armed with spears and Arab bowmen. The flotilla encircled the insurgents and defeated them. 49 Despite the fact that the normal campaigning season was over, Vespasian wanted to complete the re-conquest of Galilee. As such, the next objective was the fortified city of Gamala. The engines opened three breaches in the city walls, allowing
Vespasian to launch a general assault. The insurgents were promptly driven back and the Romans entered the town. Suddenly, the insurgents counterattacked en masse, taking the Romans off-balance and killing many. The fight in urban terrain was bitter and merciless; pressed forward by their comrades who were entering the town, the first Roman echelon was unable to withdraw, suffering fearful casualties. Finally, the Romans were able to exit the town, closely pursued by the insurgents. Vespasian deployed his men in close formation and, with the cover offered by the bowmen, he repulsed the rebels. On November 9, 67 CE, Titus led a chosen body of men in a night attack on Gamala's battlements. They took the sentries by surprise and entered the town, opening the way for the main Roman body, personally led by Vespasian.
50
Planning subsequent operations, Vespasian devised a strategy to isolate the enemy center of gravity-Jerusalem-by seizing the remainder of Judaea. During the winter, he kept himself aware of the political and military situation in Jerusalem by interrogating deserters and refugees.
With
Gamala captured, he finally ordered his men to take up winter quarters. 51 It also appears from Talmudic sources that the Legate had spies inside Jerusalem. 52 Vespasian adopted an indirect approach to exploit the internal divisions of the rebels. As a consequence, he delayed a Roman attack on the city that posed the risk of reunifying the different enemy factions. 53 Less productive, Vespasian also persisted in a policy of systematic devastation of the countryside that generated thousands of fugitives and fueled the insurgency he was attempting to subdue. 54 His plan was to clear the country and force the people to flee to Jerusalem, denying the bands of insurgents the support they needed. 55 In the spring of 68 CE, he ordered his men to advance into the region of Perea. He restored Roman rule over platform to attack the Temple and for days the battle raged between small raiding parties. Perhaps inevitably, the Romans captured the Temple after the Sanctuary caught fire, forcing the insurgents to evacuate the holy site. 64 The following day, the Romans drove the revolutionaries from the Lower City in the wake of a bitter street fight.
Titus ordered platforms built to attack the Upper City. On September 25, 70 CE, a section of the wall collapsed and the Romans attacked. The insurgents panicked and fled; Titus was master of the entire city. 65 In the aftermath, Masada was conquered in 73 CE or 74 CE, after an epic siege. 66 Some Sicarii fled to Alexandria and tried to foment Covered by the fire of field batteries, naval artillery, and machine guns, U.S. soldiers gallantly assaulted the formidable Filipino fieldworks. After a brutal combat at close quarter, they dislodged Aguinaldo's soldiers, who fought heroically and died by the hundreds. By the end of the day, the Americans had broken through the Filipino lines and drove away the Army of Liberation. 72 During the night of February 22, the revolutionaries started an insurrection in the city. Inexplicably, the Army of Liberation did not support the rising and allowed the Americans to defeat the insurgents. 73 On February 11, U.S. forces conducted an awkward landing on the island of Panay and seized Iloilo City. 74 The Americans established a defensive perimeter outside the city, encompassing the towns of Jaro and Molo. Nevertheless, the countryside was infested by insurgents and bandits. On March 16, the revolutionaries attacked Jaro, but were driven back by a strong column of infantry with artillery and machine guns sent from Iloilo City. As a consequence of the severe losses, the rebels abandoned conventional tactics and relied solely on guerrilla warfare. 75 A subsequent landing on the island of Negros was peaceful, thanks to the local elite willing to cooperate with the Americans. In the countryside, a weak guerrilla threat developed, waged by bands of common brigands, insurgents, and religious fanatics. The latter were called Babaylanes, from their leader, the Babaylan (shaman) Dionisio Sigobela, known as Papa Isio (Pope Isio). They killed, raped, looted and kidnapped, but were more like rural gangs than guerrillas. 76 Despite the fact that bands of brigands reinforced the movement, it rapidly crumbled thanks to tactical adaptations of U.S. local commanders. 77 The landing on the island of Cebu was likewise peaceful (February 21, 1899), but soon the insurgents reorganized and were able attack U.S. forces and local officials. The mayor of Cebu City was assassinated on June 11, and guerrillas and bandits raided the countryside and towns with impunity. During the summer, the U.S. Navy tightened the blockade of the archipelago, pursuing insurgent boats, smugglers, and pirates, and conducting reconnaissance for the Army. 84 On June 5, General Luna was murdered, presumably by partisans of President Aquinaldo. 85 Otis planned a new northern campaign to encircle and destroy the Army of Liberation. 86 The advance started on October 9; however, harsh terrain, heavy rains, and stubborn resistance delayed the march of U.S. troops. Faced with this new American offensive, Aguinaldo ordered the Army of Liberation to disperse and adopt guerrilla tactics. 87 On November 7, U.S. forces landed in San Fabian, on the Lingayen Gulf, supported by naval gun fire. Four days later, the Americans took San Jacinto, after a pitched battle with superior Filipino forces, and marched further south.
On November 12, the Americans entered Tarlac, the previous capital of the Republic.
Filipino forces had melted away; the northern campaign finished by the end of the month. 88 In January 1900, the Americans marched into southern Luzon. U.S. soldiers drove through several entrenched Filipino lines of resistance and scattered Filipino forces. The main concern of the insurgent commander, Brigadier General Miguel Malvar y Carpio, was an amphibious operation in the south; consequently, he deployed his best troops to face such a threat. Thus, U.S. forces confronted only poorly armed and untrained militia who gave way. The Americans captured a large quantity of equipment and occupied the major towns, but Filipino forces dispersed and resumed guerrilla tactics. 89 On January 18, a joint Army-Navy expedition departed from Manila to the Bicol Peninsula. Two days later, Sorsogon City was taken. On January 23, U.S. forces attacked the heavily fortified and garrisoned city of Lagazpi. U.S. commanders spotted a weakness on the Filipino left flank and landed troops to attack it; as a result, the entire Filipino line collapsed and the insurgents retreated with heavy losses. 90 The expedition sailed to the island of Samar, taking Calbayog City on January 26 without a fight.
Finally, the expedition captured Catbalogan City and seized the ports of Tacloban and
Ormoc on the island of Leyte. At the end of February, another joint expedition took the province of Ambos Camarines in northern Bicol, routing Filipino insurgents. 91 Major
General Arthur MacArthur, Jr., succeeded Otis on May 5 as commanding general and military governor. 92 The situation in the archipelago was worsening and the number of attacks on U.S. forces-and casualties-rose steadily. 93 Rebel forces on the island of Mindanao were relatively scarce, but they were well led, brave, and made good use of the traditional wood-and-stone fortresses, called cottas. U.S. forces were able to defeat their opponents employing mounted infantry, special sharpshooter units, and artillery to destroy the cottas and supply depots. 94 On the island of Leyte, the Filipino leadership mobilized the entire population and tried to defend strongholds and supply depots. As a consequence, U.S. forces were able to crush the insurgents in a series of field confrontations. Insurgents withdrew to the interior of the island, reverting to guerrilla tactics. The Americans developed intelligence gathering, employed long range patrols, and launched several expeditions to destroy enemy forces and camps. Filipino forces were obliged to disperse and many fighters deserted or surrendered. In the end, the entire revolutionary organization collapsed. Extremely important for the success was the recruitment of local auxiliary units, as well as joint riverine and amphibious operations. 98 On the island of Marinduque, the U.S. commander ordered all the peasants to move to the towns, leaving the guerrillas without support, food and shelter. In the following April, the insurgents capitulated. 99 The head of the insurgency in In short, the Sicarii were an organized terroristic group with a religiously motivated political strategy and sophisticated terror tactics; nevertheless, they remained unable to build a social-political base among the people.
108
Criminality was also an important factor before and during the revolt. Bands of brigands, in some cases fairly large, were active in Judaea prior to the insurrection of 66 CE. Banditry was epidemic in the region and survived the great offensive ordered by Emperor Augustus. The perpetrators were common criminals that became brigands for merely economic reasons. They threatened farmers, villagers and travelers, rich and poor. 109 Brigandage was, among other factors, one of the precipitants of the anti-Roman insurrection. The vast majority of brigand groups joined the insurgents immediately or subsequently, providing the best leaders and fighters to the insurgency movement.
Some of them did so for money and a few even provided protection to towns loyal to the Romans. 110 Bandits were masters in guerrilla tactics, as pointed out by Josephus when he states that the Jewish insurgents adopted a "bandit-like warfare" to fight the Romans. In any case, Vespasian and his generals found them reconcilable insurgents and employed them to protect and garrison the re-conquered towns. 112 It was the most noteworthy form taken by "nascent Jewish rebellion against the Romans …," 113 and "… in effect became a peasant rebellion." Bands of brigands joined the revolutionary movement and spread the rebellion. The insurgents made good use of propaganda, populism, secret societies, and religious sects. Millenaristic religious rebels, such as the Babaylanes, Pulahanes, Colorums, Dios-Dios, and Guardia de Honor, fought both the revolutionaries and the Americans. 129 In many areas, especially in Mindanao, Muslim-pagan-Christian rivalries spread "banditry, rustling, and violent crime." 130 Many revolutionary leaders employed terrorism to maintain popular backing to the cause of independence. Torture, mutilation, kidnapping, robbery, arson, maiming, and murder were largely employed to get support, punish collaborators, convince the undecided, and scare the opponents. 131 The fate of collaborators was widely publicized in order to deter such behaviors. 132 Insurgents
wanted to "create a climate of fear and anxiety, and to demonstrate that the Americans could not protect the inhabitants." 133 The response of U.S. forces was equally brutal.
Widespread burning, execution of prisoners, and torture outraged American public opinion. 134 The most employed form of torture was the so called "water cure."
135
Insurgent terrorism was at first effective in separating the occupiers from the population, denying intelligence, blocking civic action, and dampening collaboration, but in the end such harsh means only alienated the population and pushed many people to cooperate with the Americans. 136 In southwestern Luzon, terrorism was also employed to demoralize U.S. soldiers through acts of violence on American prisoners of war. 137 
Conclusion
Ignorance and arrogance are fierce enemies of true innovation. 
